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INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES OF
BUILDING DEMOLITION AND
REPLACEMENT PROGRAMS
GEORGE A. SCiUTT
With the cessation of hostilities and the return to civilian peace-
time production many business enterprises will undertake long-delayed
programs to expand their plant facilities. Many of these programs
may contemplate either or both of the following: the demolishing
of existing facilities or the demolishing of buildings on newly acquired
improved realty to make way for the new construction. The question
will arise as to how to treat the loss, if any, arising out of the demoli-
tion of the buildings, together with the expenses of such demolition,
for Federal Income Tax purposes. More specifically, shall the loss
on the buildings, plus expenses of demolition,
(1) Be deducted in full from the gross income in the year
sustained, or
(2) Be amortized over the life of the new building, or
(3) Shall it simply be capitalized as cost of land.
The sections of the Internal Revenue Code and regulations there-
under applicable to these questions are as follows:
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE'
"Section 23: In computing net income there shall be al-
lowed as deductions:
(e) LOSSES BY INDIVIDUALS - In the case of an
individual, losses sustained during the taxable year and not
compensated for by insurance or otherwise
(1) if incurred in trade or business;
(f) LOSSES BY CORPORATIONS - In the case of
a corporation, losses sustained during the taxable year and not
compensated for by insurance or otherwise.
REGULATIONS'
Regulation 111, Section 29.23 (f) LOSSES BY COR-
PORATIONS: Losses sustained by corporations during the
-taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or other-
wise are deductible ***. The provisions of Section 29.23 (e)
1 to 29.23 (e) 5 inclusive *** are in general applicable to
corporations as well as individuals.
'Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended.
2 U. S. Treasury Department, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Regulations 111-
Income Tax.
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Regulation 111, Section 29.23 (e) 2 VOLUNTARY RE-
MOVAL OF BUILDINGS: - Loss due to the voluntary
removal or demolition of old buildings, the scrapping of old
machinery, equipment, etc., incident to renewals and replace-
ments is deductible from gross income.
When a taxpayer buys real estate upon which is located
a building, which he proceeds to raze with a view to erecting
thereon another building, it will be considered that the taxpayer
has sustained no deductible loss by reason of the demolition
of the old buildings, and no deductible expense on account of
the cost of such removal, the value of the real estate, exclusive
of old improvements, being presumably equal to the purchase
price of the land and building plus the cost of removing the use-
less building."
At this point it should be indicated that while the second part of
the regulation states "raze with a view" to erecting another building,
the courts have construed this to mean "intent". Hereafter, "intent"
will be used most frequently.
These regulations have been in force for a number of years,
and for a long- time were commonly understood to mean, (1) that
when a taxpayer removed and replaced an old building already owned
and used in his business he could deduct the undepreciated basisO
of such old building as a loss from his gross income in the year of
demolifion; and (2) that when a taxpayer purchased land upon which
a building was located, and at the time of purchase intended to raze
the old building and replace it with a new one, then there would
be no deductible loss upon demolition, but rather the cost of the land
and old building plus the cost of removal would be capitalized as
land cost.4
The earlier cases, decided under the code and regulation provisions
referred to, apply them as stated above. The courts were principally
concerned with a determination of the fact of taxpayer's "intention"
at the time of purchase or acquisition. However, a recent case,
Henry Phipps Estate vs. Commissioner,5 which relied heavily on
the case of Commissioner vs. Appleby 6 has created confusion as to
the application of the regulation dealing with voluntary removal of
buildings, particularly the first sentence. In a situation which appears
to come within the meaning of the first sentence, the decision creates
a doubt as to whether the loss will be allowed in the year sustained
or whether such loss, being the adjusted basis of the demolished
building, plus cost of demolition, should be carried forward into the
cost of the new building and recaptured by depreciation thereof.
3 See Sec. 113 (b), Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as-amended.
4 See Mertens, "Law of Federal Taxation," Vol. V, Sec."28.23.
5 5 USTC 964 (1945).
6 123 Fed. 2nd. 700 (C.CA., 2nd., 1941).
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In order to reach a better understanding as to the purport of
the Phipps decision, it is considered desirable to analyze some of the
earlier cases, and thus ascertain the evolution of the Appleby and
Phipps decisions. Many of these cases are relied upon, either directly
or indirectly, in those decisions.
In the cases of Liberty Baking Company vs. Heinere and Provi-
dence Journal Co. vs. Broderick,8 the court found that the taxpayer
intended to expand its plant facilities, and at the time it acquired
additional improved realty, it intended to demolish the old buildings
and erect new ones in their place. The taxpayer in these cases
sought to deduct his loss in the year of demolition. The court held
that the loss was not deductible, quoting the second sentence of the
regulation verbatim as authority.
In the Providence Journal Co. opinion it was stated the loss became
a part of the taxpayer's capital investment, but went no further in
defining this statement. According to the concluding paragraph of
the decision, the taxpayer claimed the Commissioner had stated in
his brief "that the undepreciated balance of the cost of the demolished
buildings could be added to the cost of the new building and de-
preciated over its life."9 The court refused to pass on this conten-
tion, stating the case had been decided on other grounds. No such light
was shed in the Liberty Baking Co. decision.
The Providence Journal Co. case was recently cited with approval
in a T. C. Memo dated December 29, 1945, Bro-Jeff Theatres, Inc. v.
Commissioner et al.Y0
The Bro-Jeff Theatres, Inc. case is similar to the Providence
Journal Co. case in that the acquired improved realty was held and
operated for several years before demolition. The facts of the two
cases were so similar on the question of demolition loss that the court
followed the Providence Journal Co. case without discussion or
elaboration.
In summation it may be said that the three foregoing cases repre-
sent the line of decisions adhering strictly to the original concept of
the meaning of the second sentence of the regulation.
Where the taxpayer had not intent to demolish old buildings
at the time of purchase of improved realty for plant expansion, but
rather intended to use the land and buildings as bought, making only
repairs and alterations, but shortly thereafter discovered that such
repairs and alterations would not be sufficient and decided to demolish
737 Fed. 2nd. 703 (C.C.A., 3rd,. 1930).104 Fed. 2nd. 614 (C.C.A., 1st., 1939).
9 In this case demolition was delayed almost 7 years because of an unexpired
lease on the building at time of purchase.
10 CCH Current Decisions 14,931 (M), Docket Nos. 4008, 4009, 4014.
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the old structure and replace it with a new one, the loss was held
deductible. In Union Bed & Spring Co. vs. Commissioner,1 ' Parma
Co. vs. Commissioner," and Winter Gardens vs. Commissioner,13 the
taxpayer claimed the loss in full on his return and the Commissioner
contended that the loss should be capitalized. The decisions were in
favor of the taxpayer on the ground there was no intent to demolish
and rebuild at the time of acquisition, and the loss was allowed as
being within the scope of the first sentence of the regulation.
The next group of cases can be classed as "lease cases". In these
cases the taxpayer owned improved realty, and some length of time
after acquisition entered into negotiations for a long term lease.
Provisions of the lease required the destruction of the old building
and erection of a new one by the lessee, the new one ultimately
reverting to the taxpayer (lessor). Here the taxpayer attempted
to deduct the loss of the undepreciated value of the old building, from
his tax return in the year of demolition. The Commissioner con-
tended that the adjusted basis of the old building should be added
to the cost of the new building and exhausted in depreciation charges
during the life of the new building. The courts sustained the Com-
missioner on the theory that the lease represented a valuable asset
to the taxpayer, and the destruction of the old building was a part
of the cost or expense of acquiring this asset; or putting it another
way, there was a substitution of assets rather than a loss sustained
in the destruction of the building.
The Young' 4 case approves the reasoning and result of the Liberty
Baking Co. decision, and extends the rule of the second sentence
of the regulation not to exclude cases where a taxpayer has not the
intent to demolish at the time of purchase. The court distinguished
the facts in the Young case from those in the Liberty Baking Co.
case, and after determining that the rule of the second sentence applied
to the Young case, said "it would seem just and reasonable that the
value of the buildings removed be charged as a contribution to the
cost of securing his lease" (asset), citing the regulations applicable to
depreciation charges. The court followed the rule used in the capital-
izing and depreciation of brokerage fees for negotiating a lease, applied
in Central Bank Block Ass'n. vs. Commissioner,'- and Bonwit Teller
Co. vs. Commissioner.'
It should be pointed out here that the Appleby case relied on the
foregoing cases, and in particular the Young and Anahma cases. In the
1139 Fed. 2nd. 383 (C.C.A. 7th, 1930).
12 18 BTA 429 (1929).
13 10 BTA 71 (1928).
14 Young v. Commissioner, 59 Fed. 2nd. 691 (C.C.A. 9th, 1932) ; see also Anahma
v. Commissioner, 42 Fed. 2nd. 128 (C.C.A. 2nd., 1930).
1557 Fed. 2nd. 5 (C.C.A. 5th, 1932).
1653 Fed. 2nd. 381 (C.C:A. 2nd., 1931).
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Phipps case, the Young and Anahma cases are again referred to,
and the Union Bed &,Spring Co. and Parma cases are distinguished
from the Phipps case.
With these cases as background we proceed to a careful analysis
of the holdings and purport of the Appleby and Phipps cases. In
Appleby vs. Commissioner the taxpayer, an individual, acquired the
improved realty by devise in 1913. In 1917 the building was de-
molished with intent to erect a new one in its place, which was done.
No question over treatment of the undepreciated basis of the old
building for Federal Income Tax purposes arose until 1934 when
the Commissioner levied a deficiency assessment against taxpayer,
on his 1934 return. Apparently in an effort to reduce this deficiency
as much as possible the taxpayer contended for the first time that
the adjusted basis of the demolished building should be added to the
cost of the new building for depreciation purposes. The Commissioner
contended at the trial that under the first sentence of the regulation
the loss was deductible in the year of demolition, and that under the
rule of the second sentence of the regulation there was no deduct-
ible loss.
The court and Board of Tax Appeals held that since the building
was not used in taxpayer's trade or business and produced no profits
in 1917 (the year of its demolition), then the taxpayer could not have
deducted the loss as provided for in the first sentence of the regulation.
Referring to the second sentence of the regulations relied on by
the Commissioner the court further held, following the lease cases,
that cases where the taxpayer does not have "intent to demolish
at time of acquisition" are not excluded from the rule of the second
sentence. The court decided that the rule of the second sentence was
applicable to the facts in the Appleby case and further held that,
"If a building is demolished because unsuitable for further
use, the transaction with respect to the building is closed and
the taxpayer may take his loss; but if the purpose of demolition
is to make way for the erection of a new structure, the result
is merely to substitute a more valuable asset for the less valuable
and the loss from demolition may reasonably be considered as
part of the cost of the new asset and to be depreciated during
its life, as is a broker's commission for negotiating a lease."
In conclusion the court stated that the Providence Journal Co.,
Liberty Baking Company, and Union Bed & Spring Company decisions
are not out of harmony with the Appleby decision.'
We now come to the Phipps case, which relies on Appleby vs.
Commissioner and many of the cases cited therein. Here the taxpayer
37 At least in the Liberty Baking Company case one cannot ascertain whether
the loss was to be amortized, and to this extent it would appear to be out of
harmony.
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was a corporation owning numerous income producing properties
in New York City. It acquired various parcels of improved property
from time to time. In some instances it proceeded to demolish the
old buildings immediately upon acquisition and erected new ones
in their place. Other buildings were operated from two to seven
years after acquisition before destruction and replacement new,
the last being in 1927. The court said of this factual situation: "here
we assume, without deciding, that there was no intent to demolish
at time of purchase".
This case arose over a deficiency assessment levied by the Com-
missioner or taxpayer's 1939 return. All matters were finally adjusted
except taxpayer's claim, which arose after the deficiency assessment,
that it should be entitled to include for depreciation purposes the ad-
justed basis of the demolished buildings in the cost of the new struc-
tures. The taxpayer relied on the Appleby case for this contention.
The Commissioner contended the loss should have been deducted in
the year of demolition because there was no intent to demolish and
rebuild at time of acquisition.
The Commissioner also contended that the Appleby case was dis-
tinguishable because there the taxpayer acquired the property by devise
and hence could not have had such intent at the time of acquisition.
As in the Appleby decision, the court disagreed with this contention
of the Commissioner, holding that such distinction was of no force.
The court discussed various prior decisions, and approved and
followed the Appleby, Young, and Anahma cases. It distinguished
the Union Bed & Spring and Parma cases on the ground that in
those cases the improved property was acquired with intent to use
for certain business purposes, and after acquisition was found un-
suitable or unusable for such purposes. The court agreed that in such
cases an actual business loss occurred.
In the forepart of its opinion, the court made this significant
statement, without citation of authority:
"It is true that cases hold that where there is, at time of
acquisition of property, intent to demolish and rebuild no de-
ductible loss occurs and the basis of the former property may
be used in the computation of depreciation."
In this case it was stated again that the rule of the second sentence
does not exclude a situation such as was presented in the Phipps case,
and that this rule is applicable even though there was no intent to
demolish at time of acquisition. Emphasis was placed on the intention
of taxpayer at time .of demolition rather than time of acquisition.
The conclusion of the Phipps case permits depreciation of the old
buildings as a part of the cost of the new buildings pursuant to
Section 114(a) of the Internal'Revenue Code.
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CONCLUSIONS
The result of the, Appleby and Phipps decisions clearly permits a
taxpayer to carry over the undepreciated cost of a demolished building
which he has long held, into the cost of the new building. This result
appears to be in direct conflict with the plain meaning of the first
sentence of the regulation; however, these cases were decided by the
courts holding that such situations were not excluded from the rule
of the second sentence of the regulation. It is true the cases did
not arise over a claim by -taxpayer for his loss in full in the year
sustained, although this was the contention of the Commissioner in
both cases. In this view, it might be said that the first sentence
of the regulation was not over-ruled, but it is certainly modified by
these decisions.
The fact that taxpayer was allowed to carry over the undepreciated
cost of the old building as a part of the depreciable cost of the new
building raises the question as to whether these decisions do not
open the door for the contention, that in cases falling squarely within
the meaning of the second sentence the taxpayer will be permitted to
amortize the adjusted cost of the demolished building along with the
new building.
It will be interesting to await the Commissioner's reaction to these
decisions in the light of his existing regulations.
